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A family of protocols for quantum weak coin-flipping which asymptotically achieve a bias of 0.192
is described in this paper. The family contains protocols with n + 2 messages for all n > 1. The
case n = 2 is equivalent to the protocol of Spekkens and Rudolph with bias 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≃ 0.207.
The case n = 3 achieves a bias of 0.199, and n = 8 achieves a bias of 0.193. The analysis of the
protocols uses Kitaev’s description of coin-flipping as a semidefinite program. The paper constructs
an analytical solution to the dual problem which provides an upper bound on the amount that a
party can cheat.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum coin-flipping is an attempt to solve the prob-
lem of coin-flipping by telephone [1] in a setting where
the security is guaranteed purely by the laws of quantum
mechanics.
A typical description of the problem is as follows: Alice
and Bob have been collaborating via email and are about
to publish. Given their notorious lack of surnames, they
would like to flip a coin to determine whose name appears
first on the paper. Unfortunately, though good collab-
orators, they don’t completely trust each other, nor do
they have a common acquaintance whom they both trust.
Though they don’t wish to meet in person, they do want
to guarantee that the other person can’t cheat and win
the coin-toss with a probability greater than 1/2. Fortu-
nately, they have at their disposal computers capable of
sending and processing quantum email.
More specifically, quantum coin-flipping is a two party
protocol involving a sequence of quantum messages be-
tween the parties, after which each party must output a
classical bit. An output of zero will correspond to Alice
winning whereas Bob will win on an output of one. The
requirements of the protocol are as follows: (1) If both
parties are honest then Alice’s bit must be uniformly ran-
dom, and it must always equal Bob’s bit; (2) If Alice is
honest, then independently of what Bob does, she will
output one (i.e., Bob wins) with a probability no greater
than P ∗B =
1
2 + ǫB; (3) If Bob is honest, then indepen-
dently of Alice’s actions, he will output zero with a prob-
ability no greater than P ∗A =
1
2 + ǫA. We define the bias
as ǫ = max(ǫA, ǫB), which is the figure of merit for a
coin-flipping protocol. In the ideal case we want ǫ = 0.
Note that no restriction is placed on the case when
both players are dishonest. Nor are there any require-
ments that the outcomes agree when one party is cheat-
ing, which would be impossible to achieve. Furthermore,
the protocol must start in an unentangled state, for if
they could start in a known entangled state of their
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choosing, the problem would be trivial.
Strictly speaking the above problem is given the name
weak coin-flipping because a cheating party may opt to
lose. For example, no restriction is placed on Bob’s abil-
ity to force Alice to output zero. The case when neither
party may bias the coin in either direction is called strong
coin-flipping.
Ambainis [2] and Spekkens and Rudolph [3] have con-
structed strong coin-flipping protocols with a bias of
ǫ = 14 . It is also known that quantum strong coin-
flipping protocols cannot achieve a bias smaller than
ǫ = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≃ 0.207, as was proven by Kitaev [4]
(and summarized in Ref. [5]).
There is less known about weak coin-flipping. The best
known protocol prior to the present paper is by Spekkens
and Rudolph [6] and achieves a bias of ǫ = 1/
√
2− 1/2 ≃
0.207 (previous protocols include Ref. [7]). The best
known lower bound is by Ambainis [2] and states that
the number of rounds must grow at least as Ω(log log 1ǫ ).
In particular, this means that no protocol having a fixed
number of rounds can achieve an arbitrarily small bias.
Ambainis [8] also proves the optimality of Spekkens and
Rudolph’s protocol within a family of 3-message proto-
cols.
It is likely that the bias achieved by Spekkens and
Rudolph is optimal for any protocol involving three or
less messages. However, as we shall show in this paper,
a better bias can be achieved using more messages.
In particular, we shall describe in Section II a family
of protocols, indexed by an integer n > 1, with n + 2
messages. The case of n = 2 with four messages will
be equivalent to Spekkens and Rudolph’s original proto-
col. The protocols with more rounds will achieve an even
better bias.
The main result of this paper is the construction of
quantum weak coin-flipping protocols which achieve a
bias less than ǫ = 1/
√
2 − 1/2. This excludes the possi-
bility that Kitaev’s bound for strong coin-flipping can be
directly extended to weak coin-flipping, and establishes
that it is not possible for the minimum bias of weak coin-
flipping to equal that for strong coin-flipping in the con-
text of quantum mechanics. We do not exclude the pos-
sibility, though, that a three message protocol, outside
2of the family analyzed by Spekkens and Rudolph, can
achieve the optimal bias claimed by the present paper.
The main technique used in this paper is Kitaev’s
description of coin-flipping as a semidefinite program.
This description provides a dual problem whose solu-
tions bound the amount that a party may cheat. Though
this material has been previously published, it will be re-
viewed in Section III.
The main contribution of the present paper is in Sec-
tion IV, where we shall construct solutions to the prob-
lem dual to the protocol of Section II. These shall provide
analytic upper bounds on the bias of the protocol.
Our protocol for a given n depends on n parameters
subject to one constraint, and we shall express the upper
bound as a function of these parameters. Any choice of
the parameters, consistent with the constraint, will give
a valid protocol together with an upper bound on its
bias. To find good protocols with small bias, we shall use
a numerical minimization over the space of parameters.
This will be done in Section V.
We stress, however, that given a set of values for the
parameters, these can be put into the analytic expression
to obtain a valid upper bound on the bias. The existence
of weak coin-flipping protocols with the quoted biases
does not depend in any way on the accuracy or quality
of the numerical minimization.
Finally, the most interesting question is what happens
in the limit n→∞. We shall show that at least for some
choices of the parameters, the bias does not converge to
zero. In fact, it appears that most reasonable choices
converge to the same point in this limit, which may in-
dicate that this is the best bias that can be achieved by
any quantum weak coin-flipping protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL
We shall describe a family of weak coin-flipping proto-
cols, indexed by an integer n ≥ 2, which will involve n+2
messages. The protocols will also depend on a set of pa-
rameters a1, . . . , an to be fixed later. These parameters
define the two-qubit states
|φi〉 = √ai|00〉+
√
1− ai|11〉. (1)
The protocol begins with Alice preparing in her private
Hilbert space the states |φi〉 for odd i, while Bob prepares
the states with even i in his Hilbert space.
The first n messages of the protocol consist of sending
halves of the states |φi〉. More explicitly, the ith message
involves the owner of state |φi〉, who sends one of the two
qubits comprising the state to the other party. After the
first n messages, if both players were honest, the state of
the system should be:
|ψ〉AB =
n⊗
i=1
(√
ai|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B +
√
1− ai|1〉A ⊗ |1〉B
)
,
(2)
where the labels A,B denote the owner of the qubit in
question.
At this point each side will apply a two-outcome pro-
jective measurement {E0, E1} to their n qubits. These
operators will be described below but will have the prop-
erties E2i = Ei and (Ei)A⊗IB |ψ〉AB = IA⊗(Ei)B |ψ〉AB.
These properties guarantee that when both parties are
honest, their answers are perfectly correlated. We can
therefore associate the outcome E0 with an outcome of
zero for the coin flip, and the outcome E1 with coin out-
come one. The requirement that the coin-flip be fair
when both parties are honest:
〈ψ|Ei ⊗ Ei|ψ〉 = 1
2
(3)
will impose a constraint on the parameters {ai}.
At this point both parties should know the “honest”
outcome of the coin-flip. Now they enter a stage of cheat
detection in which the loser will examine the qubits of
the winner. If no cheating is detected (which is guar-
anteed when both players are honest) then the “honest”
outcome becomes the final outcome. Otherwise, if the
losing party detects cheating, that party may ignore the
“honest” outcome and instead output his or her desired
outcome (zero for Alice and one for Bob). This is accept-
able because the rules of weak coin-flipping don’t require
the parties to output the same bit when one party is
dishonest.
We now describe the cheat detection stage which will
involve the last two messages: the winner of the coin
toss according to the measurement {E0, E1} sends over
their entire Hilbert space for inspection. If Bob wins, he
should send over his n qubits so that Alice obtains both
halves of the state:
√
2E1 ⊗ E1|ψ〉 =
√
2E1 ⊗ I|ψ〉. (4)
This is a pure state, and Alice can perform a two outcome
projection onto this state and its complement. If she
obtains the complement as outcome, she knows Bob must
have cheated. More specifically, define
Fi =
Ei ⊗ Ei|ψ〉〈ψ|Ei ⊗ Ei
〈ψ|Ei ⊗ Ei|ψ〉 . (5)
Alice measures using the projections {F1, I −F1}, where
outcome I−F1 implies Bob has cheated. In the case when
the honest outcome is zero, Bob does the equivalent steps
with {F0, I − F0}.
Officially, we shall define the protocol so that Alice
always uses message n + 1 to either send her qubits (or
nothing if she lost the honest coin toss), whereas Bob
will use message n + 2 if he needs to send qubits. The
ordering is irrelevant though, and it could also be defined
so that Bob sends his verification qubits first when n is
odd, thereby avoiding two messages in a row from Alice.
Alternatively, they could be sent in the opposite order,
combining the verification state with the last message in
order to run the protocol with only n+ 1 messages.
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E1. Heuristically, the measurement consists of the follow-
ing process: Examine the qubits in order starting from
the one belonging to |φn〉 and ending with the one belong-
ing to |φ1〉. The qubits are to be measured in the com-
putational basis, until the first zero outcome is obtained,
which implies that the sender of that qubit loses. If all
qubits produce outcome one then Alice (being the first
message sender) is the winner. Of course, the measure-
ment is not performed in stages as described above but
rather using the unique pair of projectors which produces
the same distribution of probabilities. For example, for
n = 2 we have
E0 = |00〉〈00|+ |10〉〈10|+ |11〉〈11|, (6)
E1 = |01〉〈01|, (7)
where the leftmost qubit corresponds to the first qubit
sent or received. The rest can be defined inductively by
the formulas
E
(k+1)
0 = I ⊗ E(k)1 + |1 · · · 1〉〈1 · · · 1|, (8)
E
(k+1)
1 = I ⊗ E(k)0 − |1 · · · 1〉〈1 · · · 1|, (9)
where the superscript indicates the number of qubits on
which they are to act. For brevity, these superscripts
shall be omitted, though.
The case of n = 2 is equivalent to the protocol de-
scribed by Spekkens and Rudolph in Ref. [6] which
achieves the tradeoff P ∗AP
∗
B = 1/2. The connection is
made by setting a1 = x and (1− a2) = 1/(2x).
Summarizing, the protocol involves the following steps:
1. Alice prepares |φ1〉 ⊗ |φ3〉 ⊗ |φ5〉 · · · ,
Bob prepares |φ2〉 ⊗ |φ4〉 ⊗ |φ6〉 · · · .
2. For i = 1 to n:
If i is odd: Alice sends half of the state |φi〉 to Bob,
If i is even: Bob sends half of the state |φi〉 to Alice.
3. Alice performs the two-outcome measurement
{E0, E1} on her n qubits. Bob performs the
same two-outcome measurement {E0, E1} on his n
qubits.
4. If Alice obtains E0 she outputs zero, and sends all
her qubits to Bob.
5. If Bob obtains E1 he outputs one, and sends all his
qubits to Alice.
6. If Alice obtained E1 she measures her qubits plus
any qubits received from Bob with the projections
{F1, I − F1}. If she obtains F1 she outputs one,
otherwise (or if she receives the wrong number of
qubits from Bob) she outputs zero.
7. If Bob obtained E0 he measures his qubits plus
any qubits received from Alice with the projections
{F0, I−F0}. If he obtains F0 he outputs zero, oth-
erwise (or if he receives the wrong number of qubits
from Alice) he outputs one.
A. Reformulation of the protocol
For the analysis in the following section, it will be help-
ful to delay all measurements to the last step. It will be
also useful to never have to apply a unitary, or equiva-
lently, send qubits conditioned on the outcome of a mea-
surement. We will be able to formulate protocols with
these properties if we are willing to allow one side to have
increased cheating power.
The idea is that the analysis of a coin-flipping protocol
is divided into two separate steps: we need to analyze the
case when Alice is honest and Bob is cheating, and then
we need to analyze the case when Bob is honest and Alice
is cheating. Let us focus on the first case when Alice is
honest.
We wish to describe a new coin-flipping protocol, where
Bob’s ability to cheat is exactly the same as in the origi-
nal protocol, but where Alice may be able to cheat more
than usual. We shall call the original protocol P and
the new protocol P ′. The idea is that P ′ will be sim-
pler to describe than P and since at the moment we are
only concerned with bounding Bob’s ability to cheat, any
bound derived for one protocol will apply to the other.
The protocol P ′ begins with the same initial state as
P and the first n messages are identical. However, in P ′
after the first n messages no measurements occur. In-
stead, Bob sends all of his n qubits to Alice. After this
last message Alice performs the two-outcome projective
measurement {F1, I−F1} as before and reports outcome
F1 as Bob winning and I − F1 as Alice winning. Note
that in P ′, even when Bob is honest the outcome I − F1
can arise, that is, Alice does not differentiate between
Bob losing honestly and Bob getting caught cheating.
Technically, we should allow one last classical message
from Alice to Bob, where Alice announces her outcome
and then Bob repeats it as his own, but this won’t be
necessary as we are only concerned with the probabilities
associated with Alice’s output.
It is not hard to see that any cheating strategy for Bob
that can be used in P will produce the same probability
of winning in P ′, because the only thing that changed
from Alice’s perspective is that now she always expects
to receive Bob’s qubits. However, as protocol P was writ-
ten, the only time that Bob could win was when he sent
his qubits, so he loses nothing by always sending them.
From a mathematical perspective, we are using the fact
that F1E1 = F1 and (I − F1)E1 + E0 = I − F1.
In conclusion, when analyzing the case of honest Alice,
we can use protocol P ′. Of course, when analyzing the
case of honest Bob and cheating Alice, P ′ is no longer
useful, but we can define a new protocol P ′′ in a similar
way, where Alice always sends all her qubits to Bob. This
protocol can be used to bound Alice’s cheating power in
P .
For the rest of this paper, we shall employ protocols
P ′ and P ′′ where appropriate without further comment.
However, all bounds derived will apply to the original
protocol P as well.
4III. COIN-FLIPPING AS AN SDP
The problem of finding the optimal cheating strategy
for a player can be cast as a semidefinite program (SDP).
The dual problem then provides bounds on the maxi-
mum bias that the cheating player may achieve. This
approach was first described by Kitaev [4] (and summa-
rized in Ref. [5]).
In the following section we will review Kitaev’s con-
struction, though using a somewhat different language
than the original. What few results are needed from the
theory of semidefinite programming will be derived along
the way in order to keep this paper as self contained as
possible. The discussion in this section will be completely
general in the sense that it applies to any coin-flipping
protocol. The results of this section will then be applied
to the protocol at hand in Section IV.
A. The primary problem
For simplicity, we shall focus on the case when Alice
is honest and Bob is cheating. The opposite case when
Bob is honest is nearly identical.
We will work with protocols that can be cast in the fol-
lowing form: The initial state is a fixed pure unentangled
state shared by Alice and Bob. The protocol proceeds by
applying unitaries on each individual side, and by send-
ing qubits from Alice to Bob and vice-versa. In the last
step, each party performs a two outcome projective mea-
surement and outputs the result.
In fact, the communication part of the protocol (i.e.,
everything but the initial state preparation and the final
measurement) can be described as a sequence of the fol-
lowing three elementary operations: one of Alice’s qubits
is sent to Bob, one of Bob’s qubits is sent to Alice, or each
side applies a unitary to their qubits. The unitary step
is often not needed and can be completely removed if we
allow each party to decompose their space into qubits in
different ways on each round.
Given a protocol, let m be the number of elementary
steps, and let ρ0 be the density matrix describing Alice’s
qubits in the first step. Let ρi be the density matrix
describing Alice’s qubits after the first i elementary op-
erations, given some cheating strategy for Bob. These
matrices must satisfy the following equations:
• If step i involves sending qubit j from Alice to Bob:
ρi = Trj ρi−1. (10)
• If step i involves Alice receiving a qubit from Bob
and assigning it name j:
Trj ρi = ρi−1. (11)
• If step i involves Alice applying unitary Ui:
ρi = Uiρi−1U−1i . (12)
It will be convenient to have a shorthand notation for
these equations. They shall be written as Li(ρi) =
Ri(ρi−1), where Li and Ri are linear operators corre-
sponding to the identity, partial trace, or conjugation by
a unitary as needed to match the above equations.
Clearly, no matter what Bob’s strategy is, the above
equations must be satisfied. Furthermore, because Al-
ice’s output probabilities are entirely determined by ρm,
a cheating strategy for Bob can be described in terms of
the above sequence of density operators {ρi}. In fact, it
is not hard to see that by keeping the total state pure,
Bob can make Alice have any sequence of density op-
erators which are consistent with the above equations.
Therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
cheating strategies of Bob (up to isomorphisms that pro-
duce the same result on Alice’s side) and density opera-
tors ρ0, . . . , ρm satisfying the above equations.
After the communication rounds have been com-
pleted, Alice makes a two-outcome projective measure-
ment {EA, EB} to determine her output. Outcome EA
will correspond to Alice winning (i.e., final outcome zero)
and EB will correspond to to Bob winning (i.e., final out-
come one). Note that these operators are not the same as
the {E0, E1} used in the last section, and in fact, when
applied to our protocol EB will correspond to F1.
Bob’s goal is to choose a sequence of positive semidef-
inite operators ρ1, . . . , ρm satisfying the above protocol
dependent equations, in order to maximize Tr(EBρm).
Note that ρ0 is always fixed by Alice’s initial state, and
the above equations fix the trace of the remaining ma-
trices, therefore the maximization can indeed be done
over all positive semidefinite matrices. We have there-
fore proven the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The maximum probability of winning that
can be attained by Bob through cheating in a coin-flipping
protocol described by the data m, ρ0, {Li}, {Ri}, EB is
given by the solution of the maximization problem
P ∗B = maxTr (EBρm) , (13)
involving the m positive semidefinite matrices ρ1, . . . , ρm
subject to the constraints
Li(ρi) = Ri(ρi−1) for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (14)
B. The dual problem
The beauty of semidefinite programing is that each
SDP has a dual SDP. When the original problem involves
a maximization, the dual problem involves a minimiza-
tion. Furthermore, the optimal solution of the dual prob-
lem will be greater than or equal to the optimal maximum
of the original problem. In terms of coin-flipping each so-
lution of the dual problem provides an upper bound on
the amount that Bob can cheat.
The variables of a dual SDP are Lagrange multipliers,
one for each constraint in the original problem. There are
5m equality constraints given by the m elementary opera-
tions of the protocol, therefore there will be m Lagrange
multipliers Z1, . . . , Zm. Each Zi will be a Hermitian ma-
trix of the same dimension as Li(ρi) and will be added
in as a term of the form Tr[Zi(Li(ρi)−Ri(ρi−1))].
We will now lift the conditions Li(ρi) = Ri(ρi−1) on
the operators {ρi} allowing them to vary freely. The
constraints will be dynamically imposed by the Lagrange
multiplier terms. However, because the traces of {ρi} are
no longer fixed we shall impose the constraints ρi ≤ I so
as to keep the expression TrEBρm finite. We now have:
P ∗B = max
0≤ρ1,...,ρm≤I
{
TrEBρm − sup
Z1,...,Zm
m∑
i=1
Tr [Zi(Li(ρi)−Ri(ρi−1))]
}
= max
0≤ρ1,...,ρm≤I
inf
Z1,...,Zm
{
TrEBρm −
m∑
i=1
TrZiLi(ρi) +
m∑
i=1
TrZiRi(ρi−1)
}
= max
0≤ρ1,...,ρm≤I
inf
Z1,...,Zm
{
TrZ1R1(ρ0) +
m∑
i=1
(TrRi+1(ρi)Zi+1 − TrLi(ρi)Zi)
}
= max
0≤ρ1,...,ρm≤I
inf
Z1,...,Zm
{
TrZ1R1(ρ0) +
m∑
i=1
Tr
[
ρi
(
Rdi+1(Zi+1)− Ldi (Zi)
)]}
, (15)
where in the third line we introduced Zm+1 ≡ EB and
Rm+1(ρ) = ρ. In the fourth line, we introduced the dual
operators to Li and Ri in the sense that Tr[Li(ρ)Z] =
Tr[ρLdi (Z)] and Tr[Ri(ρ)Z] = Tr[ρR
d
i (Z)] for all ρ and Z.
These are easily constructed as follows: if Ri(ρ) = ρ then
Rdi (Z) = Z, if Ri(ρ) = UiρU
−1
i then R
d
i (Z) = U
−1
i ZUi,
and if Ri(ρ) = Trj ρ then R
d
i (Z) = Z ⊗ Ij , where the
identity is inserted into the empty slot of qubit j. The
expressions for Ldi are defined similarly.
From the above equation it should be clear that
P ∗B ≤ Tr[Z1R1(ρ0)], (16)
for any Hermitian matrices Z1, . . . , Zm subject to the m
constraints
Rdi+1(Zi+1)− Ldi (Zi) ≤ 0, (17)
because under this constraint the second term is guar-
anteed to be non-positive for any set of {ρi}. We have
therefore proven the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let Z1, . . . , Zm be any set of Hermitian
matrices satisfying the m inequalities
Ldi (Zi) ≥ Rdi+1(Zi+1) for i = 1, . . . ,m, (18)
where m, Ldi , R
d
i , Zm+1 ≡ EB, and ρ0 are data associ-
ated with a coin-flipping protocol. The maximum prob-
ability that Bob can win such a coin-flip by cheating is
bounded by
P ∗B ≤ Tr[Z1R1(ρ0)]. (19)
Our goal in the next section will be to guess sets of
matrices Z1, . . . , Zm satisfying the inequalities Eq. (18),
and try to find a set that produces a good bound on P ∗B
without worrying whether the bound is optimal.
IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE DUAL
PROBLEM
Continuing the analysis of the case where Alice is hon-
est and Bob is cheating, we need to find the problem
dual to P ′. The protocol P ′ can be thought of as hav-
ing m = n + 1 elementary operations if we relax the
definition somewhat to allow the receiving of n qubits
in the last message as one step. Each elementary step
consists of either sending or receiving a message, and
unitaries are never used. The final measurement is done
with EB = F1, EA = I − F1.
It will be useful to define a specific ordering for the
qubits in Alice’s Hilbert space. The intuition is to picture
qubits as carried by particles in a lattice. When played
honestly, the initial state will be prepared on 2n particles,
some of which will be controlled by Alice, and some by
Bob. Sending a qubit from Alice to Bob simply means
that the particle will now be controlled by Bob rather
than Alice. Alice’s full Hilbert space at each step will be
the ordered tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of all
particles she controls in that step. Note that this does
not restrict the power of a cheating player, who could
have as many extra qubits as he wants that can interact
with any particle under his control.
The ordering of the states will be as follows. The initial
state is prepared so that |φi〉 is carried by particles i and
n + i. When n is even Alice starts off with all the odd
particles in her possession whereas Bob has all the even
particles. When n is odd Alice owns the odd particles
between 1 and n inclusive, and the even particles between
n+ 1 and 2n inclusive. This is depicted in Fig. 1.
The first steps involve Alice sending qubit n+ 1, then
receiving qubit 2, then sending qubit n+3, and so on. At
6|φ1〉
|φ2〉
|φ3〉
1 2 3 n+1 n+2 n+3
FIG. 1: State ordering for n = 3. Black qubits are initially
prepared by Alice.
the end of the first n messages Alice will control the first
n qubits. The last step involves Alice taking possession
of the other n qubits.
With these conventions, the primal problem reads:
ρi = Trn+i ρi−1 for odd i ≤ n, (20)
Tri ρi = ρi−1 for even i ≤ n, (21)
plus one final equation
Trn+1,...,2n ρn+1 = ρn. (22)
With these conventions the dual problem involves find-
ing m = n+1 Hermitian matrices Z1, . . . , Zn+1. When n
is odd, all the matrices have dimension 2n, whereas when
n is even the matrix Zn+1 has dimension 2
n and the rest
have dimension 2n−1. They must satisfy the following
equations
Zi ≥ Zi+1 for odd i ≤ n, (23)
Zi ⊗ Ii ≥ Zi+1 ⊗ In+i+1 for even i < n, (24)
where the subscript on the qubit identity matrices indi-
cate into which slot it should be inserted. If n is even,
we also need Zn⊗ In ≥ Zn+1. Finally, in addition to the
previous n inequalities we need to satisfy
Zn+1 ⊗ In+1,...,2n ≥ Zn+2 ≡ F1, (25)
where the identity is inserted into the slot of the last n
qubits. The goal is to choose the matrices in order to
minimize 〈ϕ|Z1 ⊗ In+1|ϕ〉 where |ϕ〉 = |φ1〉 ⊗ |φ3〉 ⊗ · · · .
A. Choosing Z1, . . . , Zn
Let β = 〈ϕ|Z1⊗ In+1|ϕ〉. To minimize this quantity, it
is to our advantage to choose the Zi matrices as small as
possible in a sense to be discussed below. In particular,
the optimal choice for Z1 is simply to satisfy the equality
Z1 = Z2. We can remove Z1 from our equations and
write
β = 〈ϕ|Z2 ⊗ In+1|ϕ〉 = 〈ϕ3|Tra1 Z2|ϕ3〉, (26)
where |ϕ3〉 = |φ3〉 ⊗ |φ5〉 ⊗ · · · , and Tra1 denotes a
weighted partial trace on the first qubit with weights a1
and 1 − a1. For example, when acting on a matrix that
only involves the first qubit
Tra1 M = a1〈0|M |0〉+ (1− a1)〈1|M |1〉. (27)
Note that in a slight abuse of notation, the subscript 1 in
Tra1 indicates both which ai is used, and on which qubit
the partial trace is performed.
The next inequality, which reads Z2⊗ I2 ≥ Z3⊗ In+3,
is harder to satisfy, and in general equality cannot be
achieved. However, we don’t need to pay much attention
to what happens in the subspace orthogonal to |ϕ3〉, and
we can in a sense sacrifice this subspace in order to obtain
small entries in the subspace that we are interested in.
More specifically, let T3 be the partial trace
T3(M) = Tr|ϕ3〉[(I1,2 ⊗ |ϕ3〉〈ϕ3|)M ], (28)
where the trace is taken only over qubits that are involved
in |ϕ3〉, that is, qubits 3, n+ 3, 5, n+ 5, and so on. The
equation Z2 ⊗ I2 ≥ Z3 ⊗ In+3 requires T3(Z2 ⊗ I2) ≥
T3(Z3 ⊗ In+3), which is an equation involving only the
first two qubits. We will begin by finding the optimal
choice in this subspace.
Let us assume that T3(Z3⊗ In+3) is a diagonal matrix
with entries x00, x01, x10, x11. We want to choose T3(Z2⊗
I2) to be as small as possible while still satisfying the
inequality. However, because of the linearity of T3, the
matrix T3(Z2 ⊗ I2) will have the form M ⊗ I2, for some
one-qubit operator M . The equation M ⊗ I2 ≥ T3(Z3 ⊗
In+3) becomes


M0 0 Mc 0
0 M0 0 Mc
M∗c 0 M1 0
0 M∗c 0 M1

 ≥


x00 0 0 0
0 x01 0 0
0 0 x10 0
0 0 0 x11

 ,
(29)
where M0, M1 are the diagonal entries of M in the com-
putational basis, and Mc is the complex off-diagonal en-
try.
Since we are trying to minimize 〈ϕ3|Tra1 Z2|ϕ3〉 =
Tra1 M , the best choice is to take M0 = max(x00, x01),
M1 = max(x10, x11) and Mc = 0 which clearly satisfies
the inequality. Notice that the maximum is taken over
pairs of eigenvalues whose computational basis eigenvec-
tors differ only in the second qubit. Symbolically, we
shall write this as
M = max
2
[T3(Z3 ⊗ In+3)] , (30)
where the operator max is defined only for diagonal ma-
trices. The subscript 2 specifies that the maximum is to
be taken over subspaces that differ in the second qubit.
The above discussion is only valid when T3(Z3⊗ In+3)
is diagonal, but we can impose this constraint on Z3 (and
the equivalent constraint on future Zi), which is accept-
able because we are only looking for a solution of the
inequalities, even if it is not the optimal solution.
7Now if we could choose Z2 to satisfy the full inequality,
and still satisfy T3(Z2) =M for the matrix chosen above
we would have
β = Tra1 max
2
[T3(Z3 ⊗ In+3)] . (31)
The following lemma shows that it is possible to choose
Z2 so that we can get arbitrarily close to the above result.
Because we will use β to upper bound P ∗B , it doesn’t
matter if it is an infimum, and therefore we can use the
lemma to eliminate Z2 in favor of the above expression.
Lemma 3. Let T3 be as above, and let H be a Hermitian
matrix with finite eigenvalues. Given a Hermitian matrix
M such that M⊗I2 ≥ T3(H) and an ǫ > 0, there exists a
matrix M ′ such that M ′⊗I2 ≥ H and T3(M ′) =M + ǫI.
Proof. Let P = I1,2 ⊗ |ϕ3〉〈ϕ3| be the projector which
was used in defining T3. This divides the Hilbert space
on which H acts into the direct sum of two parts, one
invariant under P and one perpendicular to it. We write
this as H = H‖ ⊕H⊥.
Let λ be the largest eigenvalue of (I − P )H(I − P ).
Define the block diagonal matrix B as follows: the block
acting on the space H‖ has the form M ⊗ I2 + ǫI, and
the block acting on H⊥ has the form (λ + y)I for some
constant y > 0.
Let γ be the maximum over normalized states |Ψ〉,|Φ〉
of |〈Φ|PH(I−P )|Ψ〉|. Then for any normalized state |Ψ〉
we have
〈Ψ|(B −H)|Ψ〉 ≥ ǫ〈Ψ|P |Ψ〉+ y〈Ψ|(I − P )|Ψ〉 (32)
−2γ
√
〈Ψ|P |Ψ〉〈Ψ|(I − P )|Ψ〉.
As long as y >
√
γ
ǫ , the expression is greater than zero,
which implies B > H . It should be clear that B has the
formM ′⊗I2 and that theM ′ defined in this way satisfies
T3(M
′) =M + ǫI.
The above lemma is used with H = Z3 ⊗ In+3, and
letting Z2 = M
′. At this point the pattern begins to
repeat itself. We can choose Z3 = Z4 and get
β = Tra1 max
2
[T3(Z4 ⊗ In+3)] = Tra1 max
2
[Tra3 T5(Z4)] ,
(33)
where T5 is the partial trace using the state |ϕ5〉 = |φ5〉⊗
|φ7〉 ⊗ · · · .
Using the lemma again we eliminate Z4 in favor of Z5:
β = Tra1 max
2
[
Tra3 max
4
[T5(Z5 ⊗ In+5)]
]
, (34)
where the expression is only valid if T5(Z5 ⊗ In+5) is
diagonal in the computational basis (which will force
T3(Z3 ⊗ In+3) to be diagonal as well).
One may worry that repeated uses of the lemma will
make Z3 have arbitrarily large entries which means that
the lemma can no longer be used to eliminate Z2. But
the problems can be eliminated by taking the limits in
the proper order, or more appropriately, by making sure
that the coefficient y associated with Z2 is much larger
than the one associated with Z4 which in turn needs to
be much larger than the one associated with Z6 and so
on.
The process is repeated until in the last step, when n
is odd, the innermost expression is of the form Tn(Zn ⊗
I2n) = Tn(Zn+1 ⊗ I2n) = Tran Zn+1, yielding
β = Tra1 max
2
[
Tra3 max
4
[Tra5 · · ·Tran [Zn+1]]
]
. (35)
When n is even, we had the special inequality Zn⊗ In ≥
Zn+1 which is satisfied by choosing Zn = max
n
[Zn+1], so
that we get the same alternating expression, with the
innermost operation a max:
β = Tra1 max
2
[
Tra3 max
4
[
Tra5 · · ·max
n
[Zn+1]
]]
. (36)
Both of these formulas are valid only if Zn+1 is diago-
nal in the computational basis, which will make all the
matrices of the form Ti(Zi) for odd i diagonal as well.
We are now left with the task of minimizing β as a
function of Zn+1 with the constraint that Zn+1 must be
real and diagonal in the computational basis and must
satisfy the inequality Zn+1 ⊗ I ≥ F1.
In fact, when Zn+1 is diagonal the inequality can be
simplified further. In the qubit ordering we have chosen,
the final state of the protocol right before measurement
should be |ψ〉 = |φ1〉1,n+1 ⊗ |φ2〉2,n+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φn〉n,2n
where we have explicitly listed the location of each qubit.
Therefore F1 = 2E1⊗E1|ψ〉〈ψ|E1⊗E1 has support only
on the 2n dimensional subspace spanned by states where
qubits i and i + n are equal for all i. The constraint
Zn+1 ⊗ I ≥ F1 need only be checked in this subspace
where it takes the form
Zn+1 ≥ |ξB〉〈ξB |, (37)
where
|ξ〉 = (√a1|0〉+√1− a1|1〉)⊗ (√a2|0〉+√1− a2|1〉)
· · · ⊗ (√an|0〉+√1− an|1〉) , (38)
and |ξB〉 =
√
2E1|ξ〉, which is correctly normalized by
the factor
√
2 if the coin is fair when both players are
honest.
B. Example n = 3
At this point an example would probably be helpful.
We shall look at the case n = 3:
|ξB〉 =
√
2
( √
a1a2a3|000〉+
√
a1(1− a2)a3|010〉
+
√
a1(1− a2)(1 − a3)|011〉
+
√
(1− a1)a2a3|100〉
+
√
(1− a1)(1 − a2)a3|110〉
)
, (39)
8and the matrix Z4 can be chosen as
Z4 =


x0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 x2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 x3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 x4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 x6 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


(40)
where the top row corresponds to |000〉, the second one to
|001〉 and so on. The entries along the diagonal of Z4 out-
side of the support of |ξB〉〈ξB | have already been set to
zero, which should be expected for all optimal solutions.
Otherwise, any set of {xi} that satisfies Z4 ≥ |ξB〉〈ξB|
is a valid solution of the dual problem. The correspond-
ing bound can be calculated from these variables using
Eqs. (35) or equivalently by evaluating the tree depicted
in Fig. 2.
The tree is evaluated as follows: each node has a value
that is either the maximum or the weighted sum of the
nodes below it. The weighted sum is just ai times the
value of the left descendant plus 1−ai times the value of
the right descendant. The value of the root node corre-
sponds to β and is an upper bound on P ∗B . We shall call
trees of this form Sum-Max trees.
Sum-Max trees appear naturally when analyzing clas-
sical protocols for coin-flipping. The basic idea is that
these protocols can be described as a sequence of public
random bits, with the first one announced by Alice, then
the second one by Bob and so on. At the end both parties
look at the sequence of bits and determine the outcome
of the coin-flip. The whole protocol can be described as
a binary tree, with Alice’s bits choosing the path at the
odd depth nodes and Bob’s bits controlling the rest.
A player attempting to cheat in such a protocol will
not output random bits but will instead choose the path
that maximizes his chances of winning at each node. If
we put ones and zeros in the leaf nodes corresponding to
a win or loss, the maximum probability with which the
cheater can win is given by evaluating the corresponding
Sum-Max tree.
If we ignore the cheat detection stage in the protocol,
then it can be described completely classically. Its Sum-
Max tree would be the same as Fig. 2, except that all
the variables would be replaced by the number one. This
can easily be seen from our formalism, because the only
effect of removing the last round is to force Zn+1 to equal
E1 which is diagonal with ones in place of the variables
{xi}.
It is well known that in the classical case, one party
can always fully bias the coin in their favor. However,
in the quantum case with cheat detection, because the
leaves of Sum-Max tree are less restricted, there is the
possibility of obtaining a stronger bound on the amount
of cheating.
The analysis so far has been of the case when Alice
is honest and Bob is cheating. The case of Bob honest
and Alice cheating is almost identical, though. The first
major difference, is that this case has to be analyzed
from Bob’s perspective, so that the odd messages consist
of receiving a qubit and the even ones involve sending a
qubit. This has the effect of switching sums with maxes
and vice versa. The other difference is the final state
that Bob will use to verify that Alice is not cheating.
For n = 3 it has the form
|ξA〉 =
√
2
( √
a1a2(1 − a3)|001〉 (41)
+
√
(1− a1)a2(1 − a3)|101〉
+
√
(1− a1)(1 − a2)(1− a3)|111〉
)
.
The maximum probability with which Alice can cheat,
P ∗A, is bounded above by α, calculated from the Max-Sum
tree in Fig. 3, where the leaves are the diagonal elements
of Z4 and must satisfy Z4 ≥ |ξA〉〈ξA|.
C. Finding the optimal Zn+1
Returning to the case of honest Alice, we need to finish
the general case by choosing a matrix Zn+1 in order to
obtain an expression for β in terms of the parameters
a1, . . . , an. Recall that we have restricted our analysis
to matrices Zn+1 that are diagonal in the computational
basis. We shall now search for the minimum value of β
consistent with this choice.
Let x1, . . . , x2n be the diagonal entries of Zn+1. We
will, as in the example above, set the variables to zero
when their corresponding basis vector is orthogonal to
|ξB〉, which will leave around half of the variables. We
also wish to work in the subspace where the two val-
ues entering a max node in the Sum-Max tree are equal.
For example, this is the space consistent with a3x0 =
a3x2 + (1 − a3)x3 and x4 = x6 in the example above.
The only potential problem exists at the lowest level of
max nodes, where a zero can be entering the node. For
the following we will assume that n is odd which elimi-
nates this problem. The even case will be derived from
the odd case below.
Working in this subspace we can replace all the maxi-
mums with weighted sums with any weight of our choice.
In this situation, β can be calculated as a weighted trace
of Zn+1. That is, there exist diagonal matrices W such
that β = Tr(Zn+1W ) for any Zn+1 in this subspace. For
example, a valid choice for W is the diagonal part of
|ξ〉〈ξ|, which replaces the max nodes at each level i by
the weighted sum using ai. That is
Tr[Zn+1 diag(|ξ〉〈ξ|)] = Tra1 Tra2 Tra3 · · ·Tran Zn+1.
(42)
This will turn out to be the wrong choice for W but it
gets us closer to the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let |Ψ〉 be a state, not necessarily normal-
ized, and let D be the diagonal part of |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Let
E = E2 be a diagonal projector.
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FIG. 3: Cheating Alice’s Sum-Max Tree
The minimum of Tr(ZD) over diagonal real matrices
Z, subject to the constraint Z ≥ 2E|Ψ〉〈Ψ|E, is given by
2|〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉|2 and is attained by
Z = 2〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉E. (43)
Proof. Because Z is diagonal we can write Tr(ZD) as
〈Ψ|Z|Ψ〉. Clearly if Z ≥ 2E|Ψ〉〈Ψ|E then Tr(ZD) =
〈Ψ|Z|Ψ〉 ≥ 2|〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉|2. It is also attainable using
Z = 2〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉E which satisfies the inequality con-
straint because by Cauchy-Schwarz 〈Φ|E|Ψ〉〈Ψ|E|Φ〉 ≤
〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉〈Φ|E|Φ〉 for any |Φ〉.
Because |ξB〉〈ξB| = 2E1|ξ〉〈ξ|E1, we are almost in the
situation covered by the above lemma. Unfortunately, we
are only maximizing over the space consistent with the
entries to every max node being equal (while keeping the
zero entries in Zn+1 equal to zero), so in general Zn+1
proportional to E1 is not a valid solution. However, by
rescaling the variables, we can get to the situation where
this subspace containsE1, and therefore the above lemma
is useful.
More specifically, let S be a diagonal positive ma-
trix. Define Z ′n+1 =
√
SZn+1
√
S. We now can min-
imize β = Tr(Z ′n+1
√
S−1W
√
S−1) subject to the con-
straint Z ′n+1 ≥
√
S|ξB〉〈ξB |
√
S. We would like to choose
S so that Z ′n+1 = E1 is a valid solution, that is, when
Zn+1 =
√
S−1E1
√
S−1 = S−1E1 is put into the Sum-
Max tree, the pair of values entering each max node are
equal. We also need to define W as the diagonal part
of S|ξ〉〈ξ|S. For this to be valid, we must show that
we can compute β as a function of Zn+1 by the expres-
sion Tr(Zn+1W ) for every Zn+1 consistent with the orig-
inal requirements. If these two conditions are satisfied,
though, then the lemma tells us that
β = 2 |〈ξ|SE1|ξ〉|2 , (44)
where we used the fact that both S and E1 are diagonal
in the computational basis.
We begin by analyzing as an example the case of n =
3 depicted in Fig. 2. Define ei = 〈i|E1|i〉 which takes
the values zero or one. Similarly, let si = 〈i|S|i〉. We
construct S so that
s0 = s1 = σ0σ0L, (45)
s2 = s3 = σ0σ0R, (46)
s4 = s5 = σ1σ1L, (47)
s6 = s7 = σ1σ1R. (48)
The factors σ0, σ0L, and σ0R should be thought of as
being associated with the left max node. The first one
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is a normalization factor, and the other two will be used
to balance the values of the left and right descendants.
Similarly, the other three variables are associated with
the right max node.
To satisfy the first constraint, we set Zn+1 = S
−1E1,
or equivalently, xi = s
−1
i ei. Note that the ei factor will
force the appropriate xi variables to be zero. We focus
on the left max node. The value entering through the
left descendant is
a3x0 + (1− a3)x1 = a3e0 + (1 − a3)e1
σ0σ0L
, (49)
whereas entering on the right side is
a3x2 + (1− a3)x3 = a3e2 + (1 − a3)e3
σ0σ0R
. (50)
For the two values to be equal, we can choose σ0L =
a3e0+(1− a3)e1 and σ0R = a3e2+(1− a3)e3. Similarly,
the constraint at the other max node can me met by
choosing σ1L = a3e4 + (1− a3)e5 and σ1R = a3e6 + (1−
a3)e7.
Now we need to check the constraint on W =
diag(S|ξ〉〈ξ|S). Now Tr(Zn+1W ) can be described as the
Max-Sum tree in Fig. 2, with the max nodes replaced
by sums. Focusing again on the left max node, it adds
a2σ
2
0σ
2
0L of its left descendant plus (1 − a2)σ20σ20R of the
right descendant. We need these quantities to sum to one,
and therefore σ0 = [a2σ
2
0L + (1− a2)σ20R]−1/2. Similarly,
we choose σ1 = [a2σ
2
1L + (1 − a2)σ21R]−1/2 to normalize
the sum replacing the right max node.
Now we can finally evaluate β = 2 |〈ξ|SE1|ξ〉|2. This
can also be represented by a tree similar to the one in
Fig. 2, with the max nodes replaced by different sums as
follows: the left max evaluates to a2σ0σ0L times the input
from the left plus (1 − a2)σ0σ0R times the right input.
But the left and right inputs are respectively equal to
a3e0 + (1− a3)e1 = σ0L and a3e2 + (1− a3)e3 = σ0R, so
the node evaluates to
a2σ0σ
2
0L+(1−a2)σ0σ20R =
√
a2σ20L + (1 − a2)σ20R, (51)
which can be though of as the weighted root mean square
of the values of the two descendant nodes. The same
thing happens at the right max node. The complete ex-
pression then becomes
β = 2
{
a1
√
a2 [a3e0 + (1 − a3)e1]2 + (1− a2) [a3e2 + (1− a3)e3]2
+(1− a1)
√
a2 [a3e4 + (1− a3)e5]2 + (1− a2) [a3e6 + (1 − a3)e7]2
}2
= 2
{
a1
√
a2a23 + (1− a2) + (1− a1)a3
}2
. (52)
The above has the shorthand notation given by
β = 2 (Tra1 RMSa2 Tra3 E1)
2
(53)
where we define RMSai only on diagonal matrices, as
a weighted root mean square of eigenvalues whose basis
vectors differ only on qubit i. This is in the same spirit
as Trai which does a regular weighted average.
For completeness, we also give the expression for α
when n = 3, which can be obtained from the formulas
derived below:
α = 2(1− a3)
(
a1a
2
2 + (1− a1)
)
. (54)
The general case is almost identical. Consider the orig-
inal Sum-Max tree for a given odd n. LetM be the set of
max nodes of the original tree, that is, the set of binary
nodes with odd depth (where we define the depth of the
root node as zero). For each µ ∈ M we introduce three
variables: σµ, σµL and σµR, which are to be associated
with the corresponding max node. We define the com-
ponents of S in terms of these variables as follows: the
value of sj , which is to be associated with leaf j, is given
as the product of σµσµL for every node µ of which j is
a left descendant, times the product of σµσµR for every
node µ of which j is a right descendant.
The conditions on W are always satisfied by choos-
ing σµ = [aµσ
2
µL + (1 − aµ)σ2µR]−1/2 for every µ ∈ M,
where in a slight abuse of notation aµ is the parame-
ter associated with µ (i.e., aµ = ad(µ)+1, where d(µ) is
the depth of node µ). The next condition that needs to
be checked is that, when the diagonal entries of S−1E1
are placed on the leaves of the original tree, the left and
right descendants of each max node must be equal. We
shall choose the values of σµL and σµR in order to guar-
antee this, in a process that begins at the lower nodes
and proceeds upwards. At the lowest level they are cho-
sen so that σµL = aneµLL + (1 − an)eµLR, where eµLL
and eµLR are respectively the left and right leaf values
under the left child of node µ. Similarly, we also set
σµR = aneµRL+(1−an)eµRR, in terms of the leaves under
the right leg of node µ. Having made such a choice, the
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value of node µ in the Sum-Max tree equals σ−1µ (up to
multiplication by σ factors from higher nodes). For every
other µ ∈M that is not associated with the lowest level
max nodes, we set σµL = ad(µ)+2σ
−1
µ′ +(1− ad(µ)+2)σ−1µ′′ ,
where µ′ and µ′′ are respectively the left and right max
nodes located under the left leg of max node µ. With an
equivalent choice for σµR, the value entering either leg
of max node µ will be σ−1µ (up to σ factors from higher
nodes) and the second condition will be satisfied.
Finally we need to evaluate 〈ξ|SE1|ξ〉. Once again
this is to be done as a tree, with binary nodes corre-
sponding to sums. The factors of σµ, σµL, and σµR can
be moved up the tree so that the node µ becomes the
weighted sum of aµσµσµL times the left descendant plus
(1 − aµ)σµσµR times the right descendant. All that re-
mains on the leaves are the zero or one values of E1. The
tree can be evaluated recursively from the bottom up, in
which case it is easy to see that the value of a non-root
binary node outside of M (i.e., one of the original sum
nodes), is equal to either σµL or σµR, where µ denotes
its parent node, depending on whether it is a left or right
descendant respectively. On the other hand, for µ ∈ M,
node µ has value aµσµσ
2
µL + (1− aµ)σµσ2µR = σ−1µ . The
root node (which originally was a sum node) has value
a1σ
−1
µ′ +(1−a1)σ−1µ′′ , where µ′ and µ′′ are respectively its
left and right descendants. The square of this quantity
multiplied by two is the the value of our upper bound,
which can be expanded using the definitions for the σ
variables to obtain:
β = 2 (Tra1 RMSa2 Tra3 RMSa4 · · ·Tran E1)2 , (55)
valid only for n odd, to which the above discussion
was restricted. Though the case of even n can also be
found similarly, it can be obtained from the above for-
mula by the following observation: the protocol with n
steps and constants a1, . . . , an is equivalent to the pro-
tocol with n + 1 steps and constants a′1, . . . , a
′
n+1 with
a′n+1 = 0 and a
′
i = ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Further-
more, if E1 is the projector associated with the n step
protocol, and E′1 is the projectors associated with the
n + 1 step protocol, the two matrices are related by
Tran+1=0E
′
1 = RMSan+1=0 E
′
1 = E1. Therefore, for even
n we have
β = 2 (Tra1 RMSa2 Tra3 RMSa4 · · ·RMSan E1)2 . (56)
All that remains is to analyze the case where Bob is
honest and Alice is cheating. Though this could be ana-
lyzed using the methods presented in this section, we can
exploit further symmetries of the protocols to obtain the
result. In particular, the protocol with n steps and con-
stants a1, . . . , an is equivalent to the protocol with n+ 1
steps and constants a′1, . . . , a
′
n+1 with a
′
1 = 1, a
′
i+1 = ai
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and Alice’s and Bob’s roles switched.
Furthermore, if E0 is a projector associated with the n
message protocol, and E′1 the projector associated with
the n+ 1 step protocol, the two matrices are related by
Tra1=1E
′
1 = E0. We also need to use the fact that Tra1=1
commutes through all the RMS operators because it is a
projector onto a subspace rather than a trace. Combin-
ing all the results, we have proven the following theorem:
Theorem 5. In the protocol described in Section II,
Alice’s and Bob’s ability to win by cheating are upper
bounded by
P ∗A ≤ α = 2 (RMSa1 Tra2 RMSa3 Tra4 · · ·Tran E0)2 ,
P ∗B ≤ β = 2 (Tra1 RMSa2 Tra3 RMSa4 · · ·RMSan E1)2 ,
when n is even, and by
P ∗A ≤ α = 2 (RMSa1 Tra2 RMSa3 Tra4 · · ·RMSan E0)2
P ∗B ≤ β = 2 (Tra1 RMSa2 Tra3 RMSa4 · · ·Tran E1)2 ,
when n is odd.
Note that all the above formulas are valid only when
the parameters a1, . . . , an are chosen so that the honest
probability of winning is 1/2. This is the source of the
factor of 2 appearing in front of the expressions, which
could be replaced by one over the honest probability of
winning for more general scenarios.
In fact, the above formulas are even more general, as
they apply to any choice of {E0, E1} as long as they are
diagonal projectors. In such a case, the symmetries that
were used above are no longer valid, but direct compu-
tations should lead to the same formulas.
V. CHOOSING a1, . . . , an
Recall that any choice of parameters a1, . . . , an subject
to the constraint 〈ψ|Ei ⊗ Ei|ψ〉 = 12 describes a valid
quantum weak coin-flipping protocol. Furthermore, we
have an analytic upper bound on the bias given by
ǫ ≤ max (α, β)− 1
2
, (57)
expressed as a function of these parameters. Now we
need to chose values for the parameters, which ideally
should be selected to produce a bias as small as possible.
Because the expressions for α and β are complicated,
we shall employ numerical minimization to find optimal
values for the parameters for certain small values of n.
The values obtained will prove the existence of protocols
with the quoted biases.
Fortunately, the quality of the minimization does not
need to be verified. For example, it would be perfectly
acceptable if rather than finding the true minimum, we
only found a local minimum, or even if the outputted
parameters did not constitute a minimum at all. All that
is needed is for the parameters to satisfy the constraint,
and produce the quoted bias when substituted into the
expressions for α and β.
Note there is an issue with the constraint because it
can only be satisfied to the accuracy with which the pa-
rameters are specified. That is, when the parameters
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are described to finite accuracy, the coin will not be ex-
actly fair when both players are honest. Of course, this
is to be expected for any practical implementation of the
protocol. However, we also claim that from a theoret-
ical perspective, there are parameters close to the ones
quoted that satisfy the constraint exactly, and produce
protocols with a bias equal to the quoted numbers to the
given accuracy.
In addition to the constraint 〈ψ|Ei ⊗ Ei|ψ〉 = 12 ,
the minimizations were carried out with the constraint
α = β. For n = 3, we find α = β ≃ 0.69905 at
a1 = 0.74094, a2 = 0.479696 and a3 = 0.186312. Though
strictly speaking we should write that there exists a pro-
tocol with n = 3 and ǫ ≤ 0.1991, for simplicity we will
write ǫ = 0.199 which is understood to be correct only
up to the given accuracy.
Though so far we have only derived an upper bound
on the bias, it is fair to claim that there exist protocols
with a bias equal to the upper bound because protocols
can always be weakened. For example, in the first round
with some probability Alice decides to let Bob determine
the outcome of the coin, otherwise, with some probability
Bob decides to let Alice determine the coin outcome and,
if none of these events take place, then the protocol is
started normally.
Continuing with the analysis of small n, we find: for
n = 4 we get ǫ ≃ 0.1957, for n = 6 we get ǫ ≃ 0.1937,
for n = 8 we get ǫ ≃ 0.1931, and for n = 10 we get
ǫ ≃ 0.1927. For completeness, we list the values used for
n = 8: a1 = 0.680706, a2 = 0.43281, a3 = 0.323787, a4 =
0.264123, a5 = 0.224377, a6 = 0.197997, a7 = 0.177191
and a8 = 0.0834815.
To analyze larger values of n one needs to change the
exponential formulas for α and β into expressions that
can be computed in a time linear in n. This can be done
because of the special structure of our choice of {E0, E1}.
Because the construction is not central to the claims of
this paper, we shall only give a brief example below:
The expression Tra1 RMSa2 · · ·Tran E1 can be com-
puted using a tree, with binary nodes alternating be-
tween weighted sums and weighted root mean square.
The leaves at the lowest level take only the two values
zero and one, which should be though of as a high value
and a low value. Entering into the lowest sum nodes are
only two possibilities: both entries are the high value, or
the left descendant is high and the right one low. There-
fore, if we assign values to the sum nodes they will only
take on two values, a high value (equal to the previous
high value) and a low value (equal to the weighted sum
anHigh+(1−an)Low). Entering into the next level RMS
node there are also only two possibilities: two low values,
or a high (from the right) and a low (from the left). This
structure repeats all the way up to the root node, which
is computed as the weighted sum of the high and low of
the previous node.
In summary, the value of Tra1 RMSa2 · · ·Tran E1 can
be computed in linear time as follows: Start with
(Hn, Ln) = (1, 0) and update using the two rules (1)
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0.6915
0.692
0.6925
0.693
FIG. 4: Plot of the bounds on cheating as a function of n,
for parameters ak = 1/k. The solid line corresponds to β and
dotted line to α. These bounds are only valid for even n.
if n − i is even then Hi−1 = Hi and Li−1 = aiHi +
(1 − ai)Li, (2) if n − i is odd then Li−1 = Li and
Hi−1 =
√
aiL2i + (1− ai)H2i . The value of the root node
is L0 = a1H1 + (1 − a1)L1. The value of β is then two
times the value of the root node squared. The value of
the constraint can also be computed in a similar way by
replacing the weighted root mean square average with a
weighted linear average.
Using these linear time formulas, it is possible to com-
pute α and β for large values of n given a specific func-
tional form for ak as a function of k ≤ n. A theoreti-
cally pleasant, though non-optimal choice, is ak = 1/k
for n even. Recall that {E0, E1} can be described by the
process whereby the qubits are examined starting from
qubit n to qubit 1, and the first zero that is found deter-
mines the winner. With ak = 1/k, the probability that
qubit k needs to be examined is k/n, and therefore each
qubit determines the outcome with a probability of 1/n.
The problem with this choice is that Bob’s probability of
winning given that qubit k needs to be examined keeps
oscillating between 1/2 and numbers greater than 1/2.
That is why for ak = 1/k, Bob has the ability to cheat
a lot, whereas Alice is more restricted. With some work,
the problem could be fixed by adjusting the values of ak
for k ∼ 1 and k ∼ n.
The values of α and β as a function of even n for ak =
1/k have been plotted in Fig. 4. The upper solid line
corresponds to β and the lower dotted line to α. For odd
n we would have to use ak = 1/(k + 1) to satisfy the
constraint, and this would switch the values of α and β.
For large n, the graphs converge towards 0.6922, or
a bias of ǫ = 0.1922. The same behavior occurs with
many other reasonable choices for ak as a function of k.
We believe that all choices will converge in the limit of
n → ∞ to a bias of 0.1922 (or higher for bad choices),
but we shall not prove this in the present paper.
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VI. SUMMARY
We have shown the existence of quantum weak coin-
flipping protocols with biases as low as 0.193 and converg-
ing to a number near 0.192 as n → ∞. Unfortunately,
this appears to be the smallest bias that can be achieved
by the protocol described in this paper for any number
of rounds.
Many possibilities remain open. The first is that quan-
tum weak coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias is im-
possible, and that the optimal bias is either 0.192 or some
number below it. This would be unfortunate, but in the
opinion of the author not all that improbable.
Another possibility is that there exists a different fam-
ily of protocols that produces arbitrarily small bias. In
fact, a third possibility is that the protocol presented
in this paper has an arbitrarily small bias. This could
happen either because some better choice of parameters
{ak} does produce arbitrarily small bias, or because the
upper bounds α and β are not tight and converge to a
different value than the true bias. The last possibility
could be eliminated by constructing cheating strategies
that achieve biases equal to the upper bound.
Further research will be needed to distinguish these
possibilities, and to finally settle the question of whether
quantum weak coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias is
possible.
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